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Abstract
This article examines the choice of health care in Japan by patients suffering from the
common cold. Original data were obtained from a survey conducted by the authors. Em-
pirical results show that the price elasticity of demand for medical services is between 0.23
and 0.36. This estimated price elasticity suggests that if the new medical insurance reform
plan were to increase the coinsurance rate by 10% both for those insured and their and
dependants, national medical costs may be reduced by, at most, 43 billion yen (358 million
US dollars); correspondingly, this could increase the demand for over-the-counter (OTC)
medicine, at most, by 8.8 billion yen (73.3 million US dollars). This result implies that
medical services and OTC medications are substitutes. Moreover, a tenfold increase in the
provision of information on drugs could reduce national medical costs by 60 billion yen
(500 million US dollars) at most, with a corresponding increase in the demand for OTC
medications by about 6.9 billion yen (57.5 million U.S. dollars).
JEL Classifications: I11,I12, I31, I18
Keywords: minor illnesses, medical service demand, medical insurance system, over-the-
counter medication
1 Introduction
Japan’s health care system has been relatively successful. Gross health indicators are the
best in the world: the infant mortality rate is 0.46% of live births, and the life expectancy
is 75.9 years for males and 81.8 years for females(World Bank, 1998).
There is universal coverage with virtually unlimited access to all health care facilities.
As a ratio of national income in Japan, national medical costs were 7.09% in 1995. This
figure is a little more than half of the same ratio in the United States. However, in 1997
national medical costs exceeded 28 trillion yen (about 230 billion US dollars) and continue
to rise by at least one trillion yen per year.
At least three factors account for this expenditure growth. The first factor is the aging
population. The Japanese population is aging at a much faster rate than in other industrial
nations, and this is expected to contribute to a continued rise in the costs of medical care.
The second factor is the high utilization of hospitals. In Japan there is little functional
differentiation between clinics and hospitals, and their boundary is further blurred because
a third of the clinics have a small number of beds (the distinction is primarily legal in
that facilities with more than 20 beds are designated as hospitals, whereas those having
fewer than 20 are called clinics). Neither is there much differentiation between acute and
long-term care(Ikegami, 1992). The price charged by all providers (hospitals and clinics)
is uniform, assuming that their quality is the same. However, patients are increasingly
turning away from clinics in favour of hospitals because of their perceived higher quality.
As a result, there are long queues for outpatients’ visits and waiting lists for admissions to
hospital. This situation is difficult to reverse because ’freedom of choice’ is regarded as the
cardinal principle in the delivery of health care in Japan.
The third factor is the high per capita costs for medications. Most physicians in clinics
do their own dispensing, and hospital-based doctors dispense from the associated institu-
tion’s pharmacy. The government sets no limits on the quantity of medications dispensed.
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Market prices are surveyed periodically by the government and reimbursement prices are
accordingly adjusted. However, providers continue to make profits because competition
leads to continual price-cutting. They maintain that they need this margin to offset the
relatively low reimbursement rates for the medical procedures they provide. Therefore,
doctors have an incentive to over-prescribe. Patients’ medical insurance covers medication
costs, giving them a price incentive to favour prescribed products.
The health care reform plan proposes to increase the coinsurance rate for relatively minor
illnesses, as well as for prescribed medications for these minor illnesses. Minor illnesses are
illnesses such as the common cold and diarrhoea, which are curable by standard treatment
and at reasonable cost. As there are a few options besides medical services provided by a
hospital or a clinic, the anticipated effect of an increase in the coinsurance rate on national
medical costs is not clear. If patients are not sensitive to a price change, an increase in the
coinsurance rate may not have an appreciable effect on national costs. On the other hand,
if patients are sensitive to a price increase, they may choose other options and decide to
seek medical services less frequently. An increase in the coinsurance rate will then decrease
the national medical costs.
In this paper we assume that when suffering from minor illnesses a patient has three
options: he or she can consult a doctor, can purchase OTC medications, or do nothing.
The price sensitivity, therefore, may be relatively high, but this has to be tested empirically
1).
The demand for OTC medications has been analysed since the 1960s(Greenlick and
Darsky, 1968). However, it was not until the 1990s that researchers emphasized the sav-
ings that governments may make by switching to OTC drugs(Johnson, 1991; McNamee,
1994). In the late 1980s the British government supported the OTC medicine market
by reclassifying certain prescription medicines to allow OTC sales in pharmacies. Eleven
medicines were reclassified between 1983 and 1992, and from 1992 to early 1996, 40 more
medicines were reclassified(Blenkinsopp and Bradley, 1996).
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McNamee(1994) pointed out that in France, if annual OTC sales were to increase by
10%, the saving would be about FF 3.4 billion. In the Netherlands, if 10-15 million visits
to the doctor could be avoided, the savings to the state from self-medication would amount
to DG 450-750 million. However, these figures are estimates by medical practitioners and
pharmacists, and are not based on proper economic analysis.
In the United States, where extensive research on health economics is undertaken, only a
few studies focus on demand for medical services related to minor illnesses, or on the sub-
stitution between prescribed and OTC medications (Stuart and Grana, 1995; Fillenbaum
et al., 1993). Of these few studies, particular attention is paid to the research of Lei-
bowitz(1989) because of its originality and, most of all, its research design. The research
was part of the study referred to as the Health Insurance Experiment (HIE) that New-
house(1993) and others at the RAND institute initiated in 1971, lasting for about 10 years.
HIE was a longitudinal study that experimentally altered the medical care cost-sharing
faced by families. Between November 1974 and February 1977 HIE assigned families to
insurance plans that differed in the amount of cost-sharing. According to this study, under
a free plan (defined as no out-of-pocket cost to the family), compared to a 95% coinsur-
ance plan (families paid 95% of their medical expenses), the demand for medical services
increased by about 20%. The spending on medical services under the free plan was 50%
more than that of the 95% coinsurance plan. This means the price elasticity of medical
service was, on average, 0.21.
Using the HIE, Leibowitz(1989) focused on minor illnesses and analysed the substitu-
tion between prescribed and OTC medications. Her empirical results did not support the
expectation that people assigned less generous insurance for prescription drugs substitute
OTC for prescriptions. Although the price elasticity was not accounted for in either study,
Newhouse(1993) indicated that, in the case of influenza, the price elasticity was around
unity. This suggests that for minor illnesses, the demand for medical services is relatively
sensitive to price.
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In Japan there are only a few studies that estimate the demand for medical services.
Among these studies, Yamada(1997) used hospital-based data to estimate the demand for
medical services. Without the use of a household-based survey, he was not able to analyse
patients’ preferences, decisions and behaviour regarding medical services.
Ii and Ohkusa(1998) were the first to attempt an estimation of the demand for medical
services related to minor illnesses. They modelled explicitly the incidence of minor illnesses
and, using micro household data, measured the price elasticity of the demand for medical
care for minor illnesses in Japan. Their data, from the Comprehensive Survey of Living
Conditions(CSLC), were not experimentally or extensively collected like the data in the
HIE. However, the sample size in the CSLC - about 600,000 - is much larger compared to
that of the HIE, which was about 2000. CSLC includes household and individual charac-
teristics such as gender, age, income and assets, and detailed health information. Their
results show that the price elasticity for medical services was 0.208, which is comparable to
that for the United States, and that medical services and OTC medications are substitutes.
Using patients’ health information from the CSLC to define minor illnesses, Ii and
Ohkusa(2002) estimated price elasticities for various minor illnesses. They found that
in the case of minor illnesses, the price elasticities for medical services were between 0.144
and 0.149. The data set also included detailed information on 43 subjective symptoms. The
authors estimated price elasticities separately for medical services demanded for these 43
symptoms and found that, for almost half of the symptoms, the price elasticities estimated
were less than unity.
This paper, using original data from a survey conducted by the authors, examines the
choice of health care in Japan for patients suffering from the common cold. Empirical
results show that the price elasticity for medical services is between 0.23 and 0.36.
Section 2 of the paper presents the major hypotheses of the study, section 3 describes
the data, the empirical model is explained in Section 4 and the empirical results are given
in Section 5. Concluding remarks are then given.
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2 Hypotheses
Risk aversion and uncertainty about future health events create a demand for medical
insurance. However, once insurance is in place, moral hazard leads to over-utilization
of medical care. This phenomenon may be more serious in the case of relatively minor
illnesses. As in the analysis of the optimal commodity tax, there is no reason for rates
of insurance to be the same for different types of health care. In this section, the effects
on national medical costs and patients’ consumer surplus are analysed under an assumed
scenario where the new medical insurance reforms exclude minor illnesses from insurance
coverage.
Under the universal medical insurance plan, there is a gap between the price a patient
faces and its social cost. Figure 1 shows the market for medical services. The vertical axis
shows the social costs of medical services and the horizontal axis shows the corresponding
quantities of medical services. In our model, quantity is measured by the proportion of
patients who visited doctors out of the total number of patients. The supply curve (SS)
is horizontal in the short run. This reflects the fact that in Japan doctors cannot refuse
treatment and cannot increase prices in times of high demand. Queuing is the rationing
device used to limit demand. The value of waiting time is part of the implicit price.
Suppose DD refers to the demand for patients without medical insurance and D0D0 is
for patients with medical insurance. Suppose further that the current price level is given
by AO so that the current quantity consumed in the market by patients without medical
insurance is given by QO. Hence, total expenditure on the commodity is given by the area
of the rectangle AOQH. However, if the market demand curve is actually equal to DD,
then some consumers would be willing to pay more for some units of the commodity than
the market price AO. The total amount that consumers would be willing to pay is equal
to the rectangle AOQH plus the triangle GHA, which is the consumer surplus.
Under a medical insurance plan, the patient is on the demand curve D0D0 and increases
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his demand from QO to Q0O. Since a coinsurance costs BO, he pays BOQ0F and the
government pays ABFE. The consumer surplus increases by ABFH and the national
medical costs increase by HQQ0E. If an increase in consumer surplus (ABFH) is greater
than the increase in national medical costs (HQQ0E), then medical insurance is beneficial
to consumers. In order to measure the effect of a rise in the coinsurance rate on national
medical costs, a demand function for medical services needs to be estimated.
The demand for medical services by a patient i suffering from a minor illness at period t
depends on the price of the medical service or coinsurance, pMi,t , the price of a close substitute
such as OTC medications pOt , income Ii,t, the opportunity cost of visiting a doctor Ci,t, and
other variables that affect the demand for medical services Zi,t. Therefore, the demand for
medical services is expressed as d(pMi,t , p
O
t , Ii,t, Ci,t, Zi,t). The variable Zi,t includes health
capital, employment status, and attitudes toward medical services.
In this paper, the hypotheses to be tested are that: 1) medical services are normal goods
in an economic sense, and 2) medical services are substitutes for OTCmedication. Using the
above notations, these hypotheses can be expressed as ∂d∂pMi,t
< 0, ∂d∂pOt
> 0, ∂d∂Ii,t > 0,
∂d
∂Ci,t < 0,
and ∂d∂Zi,t < 0. That is, an increase in coinsurance decreases the demand for medical care,
an increase in the price of OTC medications increases the demand for medical care, an
increase in income level increases the demand for medical care, an increase in the time cost
decreases the demand for medical care, and, finally, an increase in health capital decreases
the demand for medical care. When relatively healthy people suffer from an illness, they
are more likely to recover sooner than do other sufferers. Therefore, the marginal cost of
receiving medical services is considered to be low.
3 Data
The data for this research were obtained from a survey conducted from November 1, 1997,
to January 20, 1998, in Kanto (Tokyo, Kanagawa, Saitama, and Chiba) and Kansai (Osaka,
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Kyoto, Nara, and Hyogo) areas. The questionnaire asked about household and individual
characteristics, as well as illness histories, treatments, and progress. Of the total 600
questionnaires distributed, 548 were completed and returned 2).
The most important finding from the survey was the variation in the coinsurance rates.
Under the Japanese health insurance system, except for the 0.6% of the population receiving
public health care assistance, through legislation all Japanese must be covered by National
Health Insurance or Employees’ Insurance plans. For self-employed persons, pensioners and
their dependants (National Health Insurance), the coinsurance rate is set by the government
at 30%. For employees (Employees’ Insurance), the coinsurance rate is set at 20% of the
medical costs, and at 30% for their dependants. However, Table 1 shows that coinsurance
rates vary from zero to 30%. At least 9% of employees and 19.4% of their dependants were
receiving medical services beyond government provision.
The questionnaire identified patients suffering from a common cold, stiff shoulders, and
stomach-ache. As a sufficient sample size was obtained for those suffering only from a
common cold, the analysis was restricted to patients suffering from this complaint. The
analysis focuses on those between the ages of 22 and 59 years. This age group faces higher
opportunity costs and is, therefore, an appropriate sample for analysing the substitutability
between the demand for medical services and the demand for OTC medications. Our
sample areas, the Kanto and Kansai areas, enjoy a higher enrolment rate in college and
university than any other area in Japan. Therefore, we focus on those older than 22 years
of age. Moreover, for those older than 60 years, special medical care benefits are available
through the Medical Services Act for the Aged. For those younger than six years, each
local government provides an array of health services.
Table 2 shows the sample statistics. The sample size is 225. Among the patients who
suffered from a common cold, 42% sought medical services in hospitals, 41% purchased
OTC medications and 17% did not seek medical attention.
OTC prices were collected for this survey, but the sample size was too small to be
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analysed. Instead, the prices of one popular brand of OTC medication are used because
the authors were able to obtain regional sale prices on this particular brand 3).
Table 2 reveals the following characteristics: 28.9% of the patients are in their thirties,
24% are in their forties, and 25% in their fifties. Of the total 225 patients, 60% are female,
24% are college graduates, 11% are junior college graduates, 5.3% finished technological
college, and 9.3% finished vocational school. More than 70% of the patients are in paid
employment and 16% are self-employed. The average annual income from labor and other
sources is 0.27 million yen and 1.71 million yen respectively. The patients suffered from
a common cold for an average of 5.78 days and as a consequence remained in bed for an
average of 0.37 days. The average body temperature of the respondents is 36.9 degrees. On
average, patients suffer from a cold 3.56 times a year. Among the patients, 27% exercise
regularly, 27% smoke regularly, and 10.2% drink heavily. Knowledge of medications is
modelled as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if patients know about ’H2 blockers’
or if they answer that they have good knowledge of medications, and zero otherwise.
Table 3 shows the cross-tabulations between coinsurance rates and treatments (medical
services and OTC medications). According to this table, when the coinsurance rate is equal
to or less than 20%, 44.2% seek medical services while 43.3% purchase OTC medications.
When the coinsurance rate is 30%, both demands for medical services and OTCmedications
decrease to 41% and 40.3%, respectively. However, when the coinsurance rate is 30%
compared to 20% or less, those in their fifties increase the demand for OTC medications.
In the next section, we analyse how the change in coinsurance rate affects the demand for
medical services and OTC after controlling various factors such as age or job status.
4 Estimation Models
The dependent variable takes three values: Ti,t = 1 if a patient demands medical services,
Ti,t = 2 if a patient demands OTC medications, and Ti,t = 0 in other cases. The inde-
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pendent variables are age Ai,t, gender (Gi,t = 1 if female, Gi,t = 0 if male), his or her
own labor income Ii,t, per capita household income net of own labor income Iˇi,t, education
Ei,t, a health capital dummy Hi,t, a job status dummy (Wi,t = 1 if a patient works and
Wi,t = 0 if otherwise), a self-employed dummy J
S
i,t, seriousness of illness dummy Si,t, a
knowledge of medications dummy Di,t, price of OTC medications in the region, P
OTC
i,t , and
the coinsurance rate PMi,t .
4)
We have the following empirical specification:
T j∗i,t = 3D α
j
0 + α
j
AAi,t + α
j
GGi,t + α
j
I log Ii,t + α
j
Iˇ
log Iˇi,t + αjEEi,t + α
j
HHi,t
+ αjJJi,t + α
j
JSJ
S
i,t + α
j
SSi,t + α
j
DDi,t + α
j
pOTCP
OTC
i,t + α
j
pMP
M
i,t + ε
j
i,t (j = 0, 1, 2)
Ti,t =



1 if T 1∗i,t > T
2∗
i,t andT
1∗
i,t > T
0∗
i,t
2 if T 1∗i,t < T
2∗
i,t andT
2∗
i,t > T
0∗
i,t
0 otherwise
(1)
The three choices are mutually exclusive as these choices are the last actions that patients
took5). For estimation, therefore, the multinomial probit method is used(Daganzo, 1979)
6). Because the probability of choosing j adds up to 1, we can estimate the differences in
probability. Here, we set j = 0, the choice of ’do nothing’, as the basis for comparison. The
error term, εji,t(j = 0, 1, 2), is a random variable and Ω follows a three-dimensional normal
distribution. As the error terms in the estimation are also redefined by the difference from
ε0i,t and ε
j
i,t(j = 1, 2), and the (1,1) element of the variance-covariance matrix is normalized
to be 1, the matrix should be
"
−1 1 0
−1 0 1
#
Ω
"
−1 1 0
−1 0 1
#0 "
1 ρ
ρ σ
#
. (2)
The estimation procedure is the BHHH method with a grid search over ρ and σ. This
procedure is accurate, as Keane(1992) has shown.
The bootstrapping technique is used to obtain a description of the sampling properties
of empirical estimator using the sample data, rather than a theoretical result such as an
asymptotic theorem (Efron(1979), Shao and Tu(1995), Greene(1997)). In our model, the
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small sample relative to the complex model makes any asymptotic theorem inappropriate.
Bootstrapping is performed as below. Suppose that θˆn is an estimate of a parameter vector
based on a sample X with n sample. An approximation to the statistical properties of
θˆn can be obtained by studying a sample of the bootstrap estimator θˆ(b)m , b = 1, · · · , B,
obtained by sampling m observations, with replacement, from X and recomputing θˆ with
each sample. This is done a total of B times and the desired sampling characteristics
is computed from Θˆ = [θˆ(1)m, θˆ(2)m, · · · , θˆ(B)m]. The bootstrapped α% nonparametric
confident interval is [θˆ(α/2 ∗ B)sm, θˆ((1 − α/2) ∗ B)sm] where θˆ(b)sm is sorted θˆ(b)m by the
number of it. In our case, m = n and B = 1000.
5 Estimation Results
Tables 4 and 5 show the marginal effects of demand for medical services and OTC med-
ications when patients suffer from a common cold. These effects show how a one-unit
change in the explanatory variables changes the probability of choosing medical services or
OTC medications. For example, for those with college and university degrees the proba-
bility of choosing medical services and OTC medications is 12% lower and 16.1% higher,
respectively, than for those with lower educational attainment.
Table 4 shows that the coefficient for the coinsurance rate is -0.231. This implies that
the demand curve is downward sloping, and a one percent increase in the coinsurance rate
reduces medical demand by 0.23 percentage points. Increasing the coinsurance rate from
the current average rate of 27.5% to 100% would decrease the demand for medical services
by 17 percentage points to 25% of current levels. The government saving on its spending
on medical costs would be 40%.
Table 5 shows that the coefficient for the coinsurance rate is 0.395. Increasing the
coinsurance rate from the current average rate of 27.5% to 100% increases the demand for
OTC medications by 30 percentage points to 71%. These results are comparable to those
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in Ii and Ohkusa(1998, 2002), who showed that the price elasticity for medical services is
0.208 (Ii and Ohkusa(1998)), and price elasticities are 0.55 for fever, 0.28 for sore throat,
and 0.27 for stomach-ache (Ii and Ohkusa(2002)).
The cross-price elasticity, measuring the effect of the coinsurance rate on the demand for
OTC medications, is much higher than that in Ii and Ohkusa(2002). Table 5 shows that a
one per cent increase in the coinsurance rate increases the demand by 40 percentage points,
which is almost five times higher than the 8.5 percentage points in Ii and Ohkusa(2002).
The advantage of this paper over other studies is that it uses more detailed information on
OTC medication prices as well as on individual characteristics.
The effects of an increase in the OTC price on OTC medications and medical service
demand are as follows. The own-price elasticity is -0.03; the effect on OTC medication
demand is negative and significant but very small. This means that a 10% increase in
the prices of OTC medications decreases the demand for OTC medications by only 0.3%.
Therefore, OTC sales would be increased by 9.7% by value. OTC demand is very inelastic.
On the other hand, the effect of an increase in OTC prices on medical service demand is
positive, but not significant.
Some caution is needed with the above interpretation. The OTC price data were collected
from pharmacies in the regions where the survey was conducted. These prices may reflect
competition among the pharmacies rather than the OTC prices that consumers actually
face. Moreover, OTC prices are those for one particular brand, and do not represent the
whole OTC market. Particular care is needed in interpreting these results regarding the
effects of OTC prices on medical service demand and the demand for OTC medications.
As for health capital (exercise, drinking, and smoking habits), patients who exercise reg-
ularly have a four percentage points greater demand for medical services, a three percentage
points greater demand for OTC medications, and a seven percentage points less tendency
to do nothing compared to those who are not regular exercisers. Smokers have a 14 per-
centage points lower medical demand, a six percentage points higher demand for OTC
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medications, and an eight percentage points greater tendency to do nothing compared to
non-smokers. Heavy alcohol drinkers have a 10 percentage points lower demand for OTC
medications and a nine percentage points greater tendency to do nothing compared to
moderate or non-alcohol drinkers. These results imply that people who do not exercise
regularly or who have vices are more likely to choose to do nothing, given a common cold.
For seriousness of illnesses, if patients stay in bed for one day, the demand for medical
services increases by 10 percentage points and the demand for OTC medications decreases
by 10 percentage points. If patients suffer from a one degree increase in body tempera-
ture, their demand for medical services increases by 18 percentage points and their OTC
medication demand decreases by seven percentage points. When the condition of illness
worsens, the demand for medical services increases and the demand for OTC medication
decreases.
Compared to patients in their twenties, the demand for medical services by those in their
thirties increases by nine percentage points, increases by six percentage points when they
reach their forties, and decreases by six percentage points when they reach their fifties. On
the other hand, compared to patients in their twenties, the demand for OTC medications
by those in their thirties decreases by two percentage points, decreases by three percentage
points when they reach their forties, and increases by four percentage points when they
reach their fifties. These results may reflect a social responsibility faced by people in their
fifties that is not captured by the variables in the model such as work status or income.
Among different education levels, patients with a vocational school degree have the
highest demand for medical services, followed by high school graduates, junior college
and technological college graduates. College and university graduates have the lowest de-
mand for medical services. On the other hand, college and university graduates have the
highest demand for OTC medications followed by junior college and technological college,
high school and vocational school graduates. Overall, patients with higher education de-
mand more OTC medications and less medical services. Similar results have been found
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from studies in the United States (Fillenbaum et al.(1993), Leibowitz(1989), Stuart and
Grana(1995)).
Employed patients have a two percentage points lower demand for medical services, and
a two percentage points higher demand for OTC medications compared to those without
employment. This implies that employed patients have a higher time cost. However, a one
per cent increase in labor income increases demand for medical services by two percentage
points, decreases the demand for OTC medications by two percentage points and decreases
the tendency to do nothing by 0.8 of a percentage point. An increase in other income has
a similar effect on demands. In the case of the common cold, the income effect seems to
be larger than the price effect.
Patients who know of H2 blockers, or who answered that they have a good knowledge
of medications, have an 11 percentage points lower demand for medical services, a nine
percentage points higher demand for OTC medications, and a two percentage points higher
tendency to do nothing compared to those without knowledge of medications.
If the new medical insurance reform plan were to increase the coinsurance rate by 10%
for both those who are insured and their dependants - that is, to 30% for the insured and
40% for dependants - the price elasticity for medical service demand suggests that medical
services demanded would decrease by 2.3 percentage points, to a level of 39.7%. The
Nomura Research Institute(1998) estimated that in 1995 national medical costs of treating
the common cold were 500 billion yen (4.16 billion US dollars). Using this estimate of the
national medical costs, a 2.3 percentage points decrease in demand would help the Japanese
government save 27 billion yen (255 million US dollars) on medical costs.
The cross-price elasticity of OTC medication suggests that the demand for OTC medica-
tions would increase by about four percentage points to 45%. Given that the OTC market
for common cold medications is estimated at around 90 billion yen (750 million US dollars),
a 10% increase in the coinsurance rate increases the demand for OTC medications by 8.8
billion yen (73.3 million US dollars). These results imply that medical services and OTC
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medications are substitutes.
Knowledge of medications can help reduce the national expenditure on medical care. In
the present survey, 3.5% of the respondents answered that they have a good knowledge
of medications. Let us suppose that 35% of the population becomes knowledgeable about
medications. For example, a pharmacist might provide more information at the pharmacy,
public health education may be provided at schools and in the community, and adver-
tisements may be provided by pharmaceutical companies. Then the resulting demand for
medical service would decrease by 3.5% and reduce national medical expenditure by 41.2
billion yen (343 million US dollars). Correspondingly, the demand for OTC medications
would increase by 2.8% and about 6.2 billion yen (51 million US dollars).
6 Estimation Results Without Using OTC Prices
The previous section discussed some problems in collecting data on OTC prices. Therefore,
in this section, equation (1) is re-estimated without using OTC prices.
We have the following empirical specification:
T j∗i,t = α
j
0 + α
j
AAi,t + α
j
GGi,t + α
j
I log Ii,t + α
j
Iˇ
log Iˇi,t + αjEEi,t + α
j
HHi,t
+ αjJJi,t + α
j
JSJ
S
i,t + α
j
SSi,t + α
j
DDi,t + α
j
pMP
M
i,t + ε
j
i,t (j = 0, 1, 2)
Ti,t



1 if T 1∗i,t > T
2∗
i,t and T
1∗
i,t > T
0∗
i,t
2 if T 1∗i,t < T
2∗
i,t andT
2∗
i,t > T
0∗
i,t
0 otherwise
(3)
Table 6 shows that the coefficient for the coinsurance rate is -0.361. Compared to patients
without medical insurance (i.e. a 100% coinsurance rate), those with a zero coinsurance rate
(free out-of-pocket cost) have a 36 percentage point higher demand for medical services, a
29 percentage point lower demand for OTC medications, and a 13 percentage point higher
tendency to do nothing. If medical insurance could exclude the common cold from the
insurance coverage, then increasing the coinsurance rate from the current average rate of
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27.5% to 100% would decrease the demand for medical services by 29 percentage points
to 13%. Therefore, the government would save spending on medical costs of 70%. Table 7
shows that, in the same situation, the demand for OTC medications increases by about 31
percentage points, to 72%.
The price elasticity of 0.36 is slightly larger in this section, where the estimation results
were obtained without OTC prices, compared to the price elasticity of 0.23 estimated in
the previous section with OTC prices included. Patients who do not exercise and have
smoking and heavy drinking habits have less demand for both medical services and OTC
medications, and are more likely to ’do nothing’. This tendency is more distinct in these
results without the OTC prices. Knowledge on drugs has a stronger effect - lowering the
demand for medical services and raising the demand for OTC - than in the previous section.
As in the previous section, a tenfold increase in knowledge about medications decreases
the demand for medical services by five per cent, reduces the national medical costs by
60 billion yen (500 million US dollars) and increases the demand for OTC medications by
3.1%, corresponding to about 6.9 billion yen (57.5 million US dollars).
If the new medical insurance reform plan were to increase the coinsurance rate by 10%
for both the insured and dependants (i.e., 30% for the insured and 40% for dependants),
the price elasticity of demand for medical services suggests that the demand for medical
services would be decreased by 3.6 percentage points to 38.4%. Using the national medical
costs estimated by the Nomura Research Institute(1998), a 3.6% decrease in demand for
medical services would save the Japanese government 43 billion yen (358 million US dollars)
in national medical costs. The cross-price elasticity of OTC medication suggests that the
demand for OTC medications would increase by about three percentage points. A 10%
increase in the coinsurance rate increases the demand for OTC medications by 6.6 billion
yen (55 million US dollars). To summarize, the medical insurance reform plan does have
an effect on medical services, but less so on the demand for OTC medications, possibly
because of measurement error in the prices for OTC medications affecting the estimated
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results. Provision of information on medications has a stronger and greater effect. For
example, providing a tenfold increase in information could reduce national medical costs
by 60 billion yen (500 million US dollars), whereas a 10% increase in the coinsurance rate
could reduce national medical costs, at most, by 43 billion yen (358 million US dollars).
However, by providing a tenfold increase in information, the demand for OTC medications
could also increase by more than six billion yen (50 million US dollars).
7 Concluding Remarks
Using original survey data, this article examines the choice of health care in Japan for
patients suffering from the common cold. Empirical results show that the price elasticity
for the medical service is between 0.23 and 0.36. These estimates are slightly higher than
the estimates obtained by using Comprehensive Survey of Living Conditions but are com-
parable. The results suggest that for minor illnesses price elasticities are in the range 0.2
to 0.4.
The price elasticities estimated here suggest that if a new medical insurance reform plan
were to increase the coinsurance rate by 10% both for insured and dependants, national
medical costs may be reduced, at most, by 43 billion yen (358 million US dollars) and the
demand for OTC medications would increase, at most, by 8.8 billion yen (73.3 million US
dollars). This cost containment is attained by an increase of the coinsurance rate for only
the common cold. The Nomura Research Institute(1998) estimated that in 1995 national
medical costs for the common cold were 500 billion yen (4.16 billion US dollars), and for all
minor ailments were 3.3 trillion yen (27.5 billion US dollars), which is about 13.5% of total
national medical costs. The cost containment provided by an increase in the coinsurance
rate for all minor ailments would be significant 7).
Providing information on medications has a greater effect on reducing national medical
costs. For example, by providing a tenfold increase in information on medications, national
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medical costs could be reduced by 60 billion yen (500 million US dollars).
These results were obtained using a longitudinal household survey that included med-
ical information as well as detailed household and individual characteristics. However,
the survey asked only the final choice that patients made. There is some possibility of
underestimating the demand for OTC medication.
For future research, a survey format should take into account the patients’ decision-
making process. This makes it possible to investigate price elasticity of the OTC med-
ication and cross-price elasticity between medical services and OTC medications will be
investigated, and the estimation method improved. Furthermore, research on other minor
illnesses such as stomach-ache, stiff shoulder, and minor optical and ear-related illnesses
should also be undertaken.
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Footnote
*) This research benefited from a research meeting ’Research on Minor Illnesses and Self-
Medication’ held in cooperation with the Taisho Pharmaceutical Co. We would like
to acknowledge the comments of participants of the meeting, particularly Masahiro
Toriyama and Maki Yoshida of the Nomura Research Institute. The views expressed
herein are the authors’ own and do not reflect those of their institutional affiliations.
We are grateful to an editor and grateful to two anonymous referees for helpful
suggestions that have improved the paper. We would also like to acknowledge the
assistance provided by Kazuko Matsumoto.
1) Surprisingly, there is no documentation that describes the national medical costs of
relatively minor illnesses. One exception is a report on the medical costs for a common
cold, with estimates made by the Nomura Research Institute(1998). According to
their estimate, in 1995, 500 billion yen were spent on treating the common cold.
No estimates are available for other minor illnesses because nationwide surveys are
undertaken only on particular days. For example, the Ministry of Health and Welfare
conducts a patient survey on the particular day of every year, and a hospital and clinic
survey on the particular month of every year. These surveys, conducted in summer
or autumn, do not provide a reliable estimate of medical costs or resources used,
for example, for the common cold or influenza. An approximate estimate shows that
about half of the total medical costs are on outpatients. Of these costs no information
is given on the shares of the cost for minor illnesses or for chronic diseases, including
geriatric diseases. There is a need for estimates of the medical costs of minor illnesses,
which may be provided in future research.
2) All households are paid to participate in the various surveys. These data might
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contain some bias even after carefully designed stratified sampling. However, as in-
dependent variables such as age, income, education level, and job status are controlled
in the estimations, most biases should be eliminated. As no other surveys on minor
ailments comparable to ours are available, we cannot infer the nature of possible
biases. Of the surveys on minor ailments, we claim that ours is the most reliable in
terms of sample design.
3) The cooperation of the Taisho Pharmaceutical Co. is greatly appreciated.
4) The coinsurance rate captures not only differences between National Health Insurance
and Employees’ Insurance, as shown in Table 1. It also captures differences in many
other factors, such as age, gender, employment status, and income. After controlling
such observable variables, there does not seem to be heterogeneity between the Na-
tional Health Insurance and Employees’ Insurance. Moreover, the coinsurance rate
is exogenous in this model as it is determined at the time of job hunting, marriage
or birth.
5) Of course this does not mean that the patients’ actual decisions are mutually exclu-
sive. Some patients see doctors only after conditions do not improve by simply taking
OTC medication, while others see doctors immediately. In our analysis we consider
both cases as choosing medical services. One reason for making this assumption is
that our main interests in this paper are to measure how patients respond to a change
in the price of medical services and to measure its effect on national medical costs.
Since seeking a professional medical service is usually a final decision, our assump-
tion on exclusiveness is not, we believe, a very strong one. Of course there is some
possibility of bias due to this assumption of mutual exclusiveness which may affect
the price elasticity of demand for medical services, but the bias will not be large. Al-
though our questionnaire asked only about the final choice that patients made, ideally
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the questionnaire format and analysis should consider the patients’ decision-making
process.
6) Although multinomial logit models are easier to estimate than multinomial probit
models, the odds ratio needs to be independent of the alternatives in multinomial
logit models. The Hausman-McFadden(1984) test suggests that if a subset of the
choice set is truly irrelevant, omitting the choice set in our model Ti,t = 3 will
not systematically affect the parameter estimates. The Hausman-McFadden test
statistic was 42.1 (40.8). The estimation results without using the OTC prices are
in parentheses. With 23(22) degrees of freedom, the chi-squared test rejects the null
hypothesis of independence with a 99% probability. Therefore, we are not able to use
the multinomial logit model.
7) Indirect effects are also expected with an increase of the coinsurance rate for such
minor ailments as the common cold, as it might relieve congestion in the big hospitals
and reduce the waiting times of more seriously ill patients.
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Table 1: Distribution of Coinsurance Rates for Employees’ Insurance
Coinsurance Rate (%) Insured Dependent
30 80.42
20 91.10 8.41
10 1.53 2.48
0 (free medical cost) 2.30 1.24
The Insured of Employees’ Insurance 5.17 7.45
Whose Out-of-Pocket Costs Are Less Than 63,000
Note: The law requires that insurers reimburse medical costs if individual out-of-pocket
medical costs exceed 63,000 yen per month. Some insurers of Employees’ Insurance reim-
burse out-of-pocket medical costs less than 63,000 yen. The table shows the percentage of
the insured that are covered by such Employees’ Insurance.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Standard
deviation
Minimum Maximum
Medical service .4177778 .4942928 0 1
Over-the-Counter medication .4133333 .4935296 0 1
Do nothing .1688889 .3754891 0 1
Age dummy (30s) .2888889 .4542568 0 1
Age dummy (40s) .2355556 .4252917 0 1
Age dummy (50s) .2533333 .4358899 0 1
Female .5955556 .4918785 0 1
College/University .2444444 .4307155 0 1
Junior College .1111111 .3149704 0 1
Technological College .0533333 .2246727 0 1
Vocational School .0933333 .2915476 0 1
Job Status .7155556 .4521553 0 1
Labour income (in logs) 3.283995 2.875901 0 7.467942
Other income (in logs) 5.156564 2.406581 0 8.243019
Self-employed .1644444 .3715049 0 1
Length of illness 5.781499 6.606063 0 45
Length of stay-in-bed .3733333 .9879633 0 10
Temperature 36.94533 .7779253 36.5 42
Frequency of catching cold 3.564444 3.522451 0 25
Regular exercise .2666667 .4432026 0 1
Smoking .2711111 .4455245 0 1
Drinking .1022222 .3036158 0 1
Knowledge of Medications .0355556 .1855921 0 1
OTC price (log) 7.458036 .0664637 7.316548 7.520235
Coinsurance rate (%) 27.51303 11.18549 0 30
Notes: (1) ’Medical service’, ’Over-the-Counter Medication’, and ’Do nothing’ are dummy
variables that take the value of 1 if a patient chooses the same, and 0 if otherwise.
(2) ’Female’ is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a patient is female, and 0
if male.
(3) ’Job status’ is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a patient works, and 0
if otherwise.
(4) ’Labour income’ and ’Other income’ are in units of 10,000 yen, in real 1995 values.
(5) ’Frequency of catching cold’ is an average frequency of patients catching a cold within
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one year.
(6) ’Regular exercise’ is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if patients exercise
regularly at least once a week.
(7) ’Smoking’ is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if patients smoke at least 10
cigarettes a day.
(8) ’Drinking’ is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if patients drink heavily
regularly or occasionally.
(9) ’Knowledge of medications’ is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if patients
know about H2 blocker, or if they answer that they have good knowledge of medications.
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Table 3: Cross tabulation between the Coinsurance Rate and
Treatment (Medical Services and Over-the-Counter Medication)
Coinsurance Rate Medical Services Over-the-
Counter
Medication
20% or less .4423077 .4326923
30% .4100719 .4028777
In their 20s
20% or less .5217391 .3913043
30% .3870968 .3548387
30s
20% or less .4642857 .4642857
30% .4761905 .3809524
40s
20% or less .3846154 .4615385
30% .4545455 .4242424
50s
20% or less .4074074 .4074074
30% .3030303 .4545455
non worker
20% or less .5555556 .3333333
30% .3454545 .4181818
worker
20% or less .4315789 .4421053
30% .452381 .3928571
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Table 4: Marginal Effect for Medical Services
Explanatory variables 90 % confidence in-
terval lower bound
middle value 90 % confi-
dence interval
upper bound
Age dummy (30s) 0.075755 0.089754 0.10932
Age dummy (40s) 0.046432 0.061234 0.087907
Age dummy (50s) -0.075356 -0.058565 -0.035112
Female -0.056804 -0.043996 -0.032382
College/University -0.13538 -0.12242 -0.10965
Junior or Technological College -0.032373 -0.020128 0.0071545
Vocational School 0.20522 0.21794 0.23847
Job status -0.030537 -0.016102 -0.0007071
Labour income (in logs) 0.020720 0.023427 0.025673
Other income (in logs) 0.026812 0.029387 0.031705
Self-employed -0.089425 -0.075166 -0.057010
Length of illness 0.0048693 0.0054312 0.0061722
Length of stay-in-bed 0.092646 0.097691 0.10639
Temperature 0.16952 0.17524 0.18363
Frequency of catching cold -0.0039203 -0.0028118 -0.0017499
Regular exercise 0.027009 0.036918 0.047897
Smoking -0.15247 -0.13949 -0.13066
Drinking 0.0031786 0.014187 0.027866
Knowledge on medications -0.12409 -0.11619 -0.10891
OTC price (in logs) -0.0011358 0.0016490 0.0042323
Coinsurance rate (%) -0.30342 -0.23134 -0.16714
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Table 5: Marginal Effect for Over-the-Counter Medication
Explanatory variables 90 % confidence in-
terval lower bound
middle value 90 % confi-
dence interval
upper bound
Age dummy (30s) -0.038029 -0.021656 -0.0037727
Age dummy (40s) -0.047176 -0.029114 -0.010789
Age dummy (50s) 0.026683 0.044020 0.066014
Female -0.10701 -0.092418 -0.080440
College/University 0.14897 0.16070 0.17501
Junior or Technological College 0.12173 0.15670 0.17329
Vocational School -0.052486 -0.040615 -0.022406
Job status 0.0053742 0.018164 0.036388
Labour income (in logs) -0.017641 -0.015308 -0.012789
Other income (in logs) -0.021132 -0.018506 -0.016364
Self-employed 0.16273 0.18341 0.20038
Length of Illness -0.0021959 -0.0014057 -0.0007386
Length of stay-in-bed -0.11526 -0.10347 -0.097882
Temperature -0.072175 -0.065083 -0.058178
Frequency of caching cold 0.014542 0.016225 0.017512
Regular exercise 0.014710 0.025013 0.034571
Smoking 0.049912 0.059737 0.071234
Drinking -0.11239 -0.10338 -0.091596
Knowledge on medications 0.07580 0.094475 0.109611
OTC prices (in logs) -0.035053 -0.031357 -0.028619
Coinsurance rate(%) 0.31817 0.39500 0.46690
Note: Log likelihood is -303.88. An estimated coefficient and its 90% C.I. (in parenthesis)
of ρ are 0.4902 ([0.2523 0.7155]) and of σ are 1.080 ([0.6208 1.4530]).
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Table 6: Marginal Effect for Medical Services (Estimation without
OTC Prices)
Explanatory variables 90% confidence in-
terval lower bound
middle value 90% confi-
dence interval
upper bound
Age dummy (30s) 0.094162 0.10904 0.12596
Age dummy (40s) 0.058447 0.073751 0.088186
Age dummy (50s) -0.087562 -0.071816 -0.059734
Female -0.040355 -0.025080 -0.012272
College/University -0.19360 -0.17114 -0.15825
Junior College -0.060434 -0.036440 -0.013853
Technological College 0.13954 0.16286 0.19362
Vocational School -0.07132 -0.05194 -0.04075
Job status -0.062499 -0.046361 -0.029385
Labour income (in logs) 0.026121 0.028619 0.031694
Other income (in logs) 0.022326 0.024903 0.027295
Length of illness 0.0050946 0.0056150 0.0063706
Length of stay-in-bed 0.10457 0.11061 0.11659
Temperature 0.14587 0.15295 0.16158
Frequency of caching cold 0.0012147 0.0020414 0.0030390
Regular exercise 0.019695 0.031323 0.041221
Smoking -0.10702 -0.093575 -0.081186
Drinking -0.0021399 0.010574 0.023818
Knowledge of medications -0.15934 -0.16731 -0.18247
Coinsurance rate (%) -0.39609 -0.36100 -0.33693
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Table 7: Marginal Effect for Over-the-Counter Medication
(Estimation without OTC Prices)
Explanatory variables 90 % confidence in-
terval lower bound
middle value 90 % confi-
dence interval
upper bound
Age dummy (30s) -0.032696 -0.013255 0.0019483
Age dummy (40s) -0.047747 -0.030063 -0.014695
Age dummy (50s) 0.030228 0.044192 0.061157
Female -0.13174 -0.11522 -0.10036
College/University 0.27001 0.29228 0.30798
Junior College 0.22248 0.24986 0.28003
Technological College 0.064993 0.093516 0.11642
Vocational School -0.02309 -0.02031 -0.01778
Job status 0.015790 0.034538 0.053114
Labour income (in logs) -0.023096 -0.020317 -0.017778
Other income (in logs) -0.013986 -0.0097153 -0.0076227
Length of illness -0.0027371 -0.0020713 -0.0014113
Length of stay-in-bed -0.15209 -0.14529 -0.13928
Temperature -0.028401 -0.021012 -0.013803
Frequency of catching cold 0.014866 0.015636 0.016887
Regular exercise 0.0063930 0.016952 0.027654
Smoking -0.00026420 0.011449 0.025010
Drinking -0.13304 -0.12418 -0.10996
Knowledge on medications 0.12243 0.11076 0.098558
Coinsurance rate (%) 0.272390 0.294820 0.33109
Note: Log likelihood is -298.42. An estimated coefficient and its 90% C.I. (in parenthesis)
of ρ are 0.4730 ([0.2038 0.7459]) and of σ are 1.077 ([0.6823 1.5217]).
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